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This paper examines the impact of government funded fertilizer subsidies on national level 
fertilizer use.  We use panel data to investigate how the 2006/07 fertilizer subsidy program in 
Malawi impacted farmer decisions to purchase commercial fertilizer.  Using a fixed effects 
estimator to control for time invariant unobservables, we find that when farmers’ ability to 
acquire subsidized fertilizer is treated as exogenous, it has a significant negative impact on 
commercial fertilizer purchases but the coefficient is small.  We also find that wealth and social 
networks have a significantly positive impact on who receives subsidized fertilizer.  We then use 
instrumental variables (IV) to control for the endogeneity of subsidized fertilizer acquisition 
affecting commercial purchases.  Using this IV fixed effects estimator demonstrates that when 
we control for the endogeneity of subsidized fertilizer, it again has a significant negative impact 
on commercial purchases.  However the coefficient on subsidized fertilizer is ten times greater 
when using IV to control for endogeneity than when subsidized fertilizer is treated as exogenous.  
These findings indicate that policy makers must be aware of potential displacement of 
commercial sales when they introduce an input subsidy program.  Furthermore, government 
programs should be designed to target households without effective demand in order to ensure 
that fertilizer subsidy programs maximize their impact on total fertilizer use and hence contribute 





  Food production is the major component of incomes for the vast majority of rural African 
households, so increasing yields is essential for reducing poverty and improving livelihoods.  
There is widespread agreement that increased use of fertilizer and other productivity-enhancing 
inputs is a precondition for rural productivity growth and poverty reduction.  After phasing out 
fertilizer subsidy programs in the 1990s, several African countries have re-introduced fertilizer 
subsidies as a means to boost grain yields and rural incomes.  However, the economic rationale 
for fertilizer subsidies continues to be controversial.  In addition to crop/fertilizer response rates, 
crop prices, and fertilizer prices, the economics of subsidies depends on the extent to which they 
displace commercial fertilizer use and hence affect total fertilizer use.  However, there is limited 
evidence on this topic, and this study is motivated by the need to develop a framework for analyzing the magnitude of “displacement” in a two-channel input system and to generate 
empirical estimates to inform important policy debates.  
The objective of this paper is to determine the extent to which government fertilizer 
subsidies affect farmer purchases of commercial fertilizer and total fertilizer use.  We use the 
term displacement to define the extent to which subsidized fertilizer crowds out the purchase of 
fertilizer that a farmer would otherwise have made from a private retailer.  The magnitude of 
displacement obviously affects the benefits and costs of fertilizer subsidy programs compared to 
other approaches for stimulating fertilizer use.   
In the next section, we briefly describe the dual fertilizer marketing channels in Malawi 
and why this market structure gives rise to problems in specifying and estimating typical input 
demand functions.  We then present a conceptual framework for modeling smallholder farmer 
input purchase decisions in a two-channel marketing system.  We then present a fixed-effects 
model to measure the potential displacement of commercial fertilizer purchases by government 
subsidy programs, using household panel data from 2003 and 2007 in Malawi.  Because receipt 
of subsidized fertilizer is likely to be endogenous, we first model the government’s behavior in 
distributing fertilizer to households, and use an instrumental variables approach for modeling 
households’ commercial fertilizer demand.  We then present the results of the estimation, and 
lastly discuss their implication for policy.  
 
Fertilizer Distribution in Malawi 
 
  Like many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the majority of Malawi’s population earns a 
living through agriculture, growing maize as their staple crop.  In 2007 90% of Malawi’s 
population was engaged in farming and agricultural contributed 36% of GDP (CIA World 
Factbook 2008).  Furthermore, 86% of Malawian farmers cultivate less than 2.0 hectares of land.  Because many farmers cultivate small parcels, purchasing fertilizer may be beyond their means, 
which provides an important rationale for fertilizer subsidy programs.  
  The Malawian government actively controlled fertilizer distribution channels from the 
1970’s into the 1990’s, in order to make fertilizer accessible to the population.  Under the 
government controlled system, smallholders received discounted fertilizer on loan from 
government.  This system began to break down in the 1990’s under budget pressure and 
associated pressure for reform (Dorward et al. 2008).  These factors along with new multi-party 
elections caused the system to collapse by the mid 1990’s.   
  Between the mid 1990’s and early 2000’s, donors and the Malawian government 
implemented a series of smaller-scale subsidy programs such as TIP and starter pack.  During the 
early to mid-2000s, the private fertilizer distribution industry in Malawi grew, with one estimate 
indicating that there were over 1,000 private fertilizer retailers operating in the country by 2005 
(IFDC 2008).  However in 2005 the government announced that it would subsidize maize inputs 
again which raised concerns among private distributors and retailers.  The Malawian government 
distributed 131,803 metric tons of maize fertilizer vouchers (requiring farmers to pay 25% of the 
full cif cost of fertilizer) to households during 2005/06 and 174,689 metric tons in 2006/07.  
Meanwhile, commercial fertilizer sales by private retailers fell from an estimated 186,354 mt. in 
2003/04 to 117,719 mt in 2006/07 (Dorward et al. 2008).  Dorward et al. (2008) sampled 
fertilizer dealers in Malawi and found that many of them feel they have been set back by this 
subsidy.  However, an accurate estimate of displacement must control for other factors affecting 
fertilizer use such as input and output prices as well as the potential endogeneity of fertilizer 
subsidy acquisition.    In recent years, the government criteria for providing subsidized fertilizer to households 
have been households considered vulnerable but capable of using fertilizer efficiently and 




Traditional models of input demand tend not to account for the fact that in many cases, 
inputs may be available from both market and non-market channels, and that the interplay 
between these channels influences farmer behavior.  Our analysis focuses on this interaction and 
attempts to quantify how the existence of a government channel affects private sales. 
When government and commercial input distribution systems operate together, three 
different outcomes are possible:  (1) Government subsidized fertilizer compliments private sector 
fertilizer and sales increase in both input channels.  In this scenario the government fertilizer 
program “crowds in” commercial fertilizer purchases by farmers, and this might occur over time 
if additional crop income from use of subsidized fertilizer in year 1 alleviates farmers’ budget 
constraint in subsequent years; (2) the subsidy program has no impact on commercial sales; (3) 
government fertilizer displaces national level sales and the total amount of fertilizer used by the 
farmer does not increase proportionally to the amount of subsidized fertilizer that enters the 
market.  Some degree of displacement might be expected, but if displacement becomes too high, 
the incremental fertilizer used and its contribution to output may be insufficient to outweigh the 




  Scenario 1 
(∆Qtotal / ∆Qgov) > 1: Government fertilizer compliments commercial fertilizer 
 
Scenario 2 
(∆Qtotal / ∆Qgov) = 1: No displacement                                      (1) 
 
Scenario 3 
(∆Qtotal / ∆Qgov) < 1: Government fertilizer displaces commercial fertilizer 
 
Where Qtotal is total fertilizer use, and Qgov is the quantity distributed via government subsidy 
programs.  
In order to understand the affect of subsidized fertilizer acquisition on commercial fertilizer 
use, it is essential to understand how farmers make decisions to purchase inputs in a two channel 
system.  In a scenario where two channels exist, a farmer makes his or her decision on whether 
or not to acquire commercial fertilizer based on the following factors. 
 
Yit = f (Iit, Oit, Cit)                  ( 3 )    
where Yit  is the demand for commercial fertilizer by household i in year t, I is the amount of fertilizer 
obtained from government channels (exogenous from the standpoint of the household), O is the vector 
of household level explanatory variables such as income, landholdings, dependency ratio and age of 
household head, and C is the vector of exogenous community variables that may influence whether and 
how much fertilizer he or she purchases.  Such variable include price of input at time of application, 
perceived view of output prices at time of harvest, soil quality etc.   
The quantity of subsidized fertilizer by household i (I in equation 3), is likely to be a 
function of the following factors. 
Iit = Oit + Φit                    ( 4 )  O is the same set of socio-economic factors that influence purchase commercial fertilizer.  
Φ is the vector of variables which might be expected to influence government allocation of 
fertilizer to recipients.  This could include “social capital” factors such as influence in the 
community, years living in a village, or political patronage variables, such as whether a Member 
of Parliament resides in the area.  The vector of variables in Φ does not have any direct impact 
on commercial fertilizer purchases, and would therefore make for potentially appropriate 




  There are two major challenges in modeling the demand for commercial fertilizer in a 
two channel input distribution system.  The first problem is dealing with time invariant 
unobservable factors that may bias the model and the second is accounting for the endogeneity of 
any explanatory variables in our model. 
  Use of a fixed-effects estimator with panel data allows us to control for the time invariant 
unobservable factors that may influence farmers’ decision to purchase commercial fertilizer.  
Consider the model that is a linear version of equation (3) in the conceptual framework 
Yit = вIit + υOit + ſCit + µ i + ei t          (5) 
  Where Y is the amount of commercial fertilizer acquired by household (i) at time (t).  (I)  
is the amount of commercial fertilizer acquired by household (i) at time (t) and (O) is the vector 
of  socio-economic factors of household (i) at time (t) which affect commercial purchases.  C 
represents the vector of variables outside the farmer’s control that influences his or her decision 
to purchase commercial fertilizer.  µ represents the vector of time invariant variables that may 
affect fertilizer purchases such as soil quality and community infrastructure.  (e) represents the unobservable factors vary over time that may influence fertilizer use.  В, υ, ſ represent the 
respective parameters.  
The fixed effects estimator subtracts (Yit – mean of Yi) creating the time de-meaned 
average of these variables.  The outcome, called the fixed effects transformation can be seen in 
the equation below.    
Ýit = вÍit + υÒit + ſĆit + éit                                                                                                            (6) 
The transformation removes time invariant µ variables from the regression, effectively 
preventing time invariant unobservable factors such as soil quality from affecting the model.   
Under an assumption of strict exogeneity, the fixed effects estimator can be considered unbiased 
(Wooldridge, 2003).  This implies that all explanatory variables are uncorrelated with all 
unobservable factors in the residual. 
While the fixed effects estimator effectively removes all time invariant unobservable 
factors from the model, it can not remove time varying observables and is therefore unbiased 
only under strict exogeneity.  The problem we face in modeling commercial fertilizer acquisition 
is that, there is legitimate reason to believe subsidized fertilizer acquisition, one of the 
explanatory variables is correlated with the time varying unobservables (ie: cov(I,e) ≠ 0 in 
equation (6).  This violates the strict exogeneity assumption and biases the fixed effects 
estimator.  
In order to control for the endogeneity of subsidized fertilizer use, we need to use 
instrumental variables (IV) that are correlated with subsidized fertilizer acquisition but 
uncorrelated with the error term.  In addition the IV must not influence commercial fertilizer use 
themselves.  With desirable IV we can then estimate a two stage least squares model where stage 
1 is given below Stage 1: Í it = υÒit + çZit                                                    (7) 
Where Í represents the fixed effects transformed subsidize fertilizer acquisition, Ò 
represents the transformed vector of explanatory household variables and Z represents the IV 
that affects subsidized fertilizer acquisition. (υ) and (ç) represent parameters.  
Equation (7) can be used to obtain an estimated value for subsidized fertilizer use (Ǐ). 
This estimated value can be used in the following model of commercial fertilizer to control for 
endogeneity of subsidized fertilizer use. 
Stage 2: Ý it = в Ǐ it + υÒi  + çZit                                           (8)     
  Equation (8) means that in the second stage of the OLS estimate, commercial fertilizer (Y) is 
being regressed on the part of subsidized fertilizer acquisition (I) that is uncorrelated with the error 
term.  (Y) is also regressed on the socio-economic factors (O) and the instrumental variables (Z) 
(Wooldridge 2002).  The two stage least squares purges subsidized fertilizer acquisition (I) of its 




  Data used in this analysis come from the Government of Malawi’s statistical Service.  
They conducted the first round of household surveys called the Integrated House Hold Survey 2 
(IHHS2) after the 2002/03 growing season.  Due to the timing of the study, the IHHS2 survey 
was not completed after the 2003/04 growing season was completed.  For this reason the first 
year of the panel has farmers interviewed during the 2002/03 and 2003/04 growing season.  The 
second year of our panel comes from the Agricultural Input Subsidy Survey (AISS) which 
Malawian government conducted during after the 2006/07 growing season, in order to evaluate 
the impact of the fertilizer subsidy program, which had been implemented a year earlier.  We were able to create a balanced panel of 2,591 households for our analysis from the IHHS2 and 
AISS surveys. 
  While the percentage of household purchasing fertilizer ranged from 45% in 202/03 to 
17% in 2006/07, the distribution of the dependent variable using fixed effects (subtracting the 
mean from each yearly observation) was reasonably normally distributed with a median of zero. 
Instrumental Variables 
  We use two instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity of amount of subsidized 
fertilizer on amount commercial fertilizer purchased.  The instruments chosen are the years that 
the household head lived in village and a categorical variable indicating whether a Member of 
Parliament resided in the community.  These variables are highly correlated with subsidized 
fertilizer use and have low correlation with commercial fertilizer use.  These simple diagnostics 




  The findings in our estimation provide interesting insights into the impact of fertilizer 
subsidies on farmers’ decisions to purchase commercial fertilizer.  We first present descriptive 
statistics and bi-variate scatter plots of the relationship between commercial fertilizer and 
subsidized fertilizer acquisition.  We then move to the regression analysis and first present 
results from a fixed effects estimator on factors influencing farmer demand for commercial 
fertilizer without controlling for the endogeneity of subsidized fertilizer acquisition.  Finally we 
present a two-stage least squares model looking at determinants of factors that affect the quantity 
of subsidized fertilizer acquired by farm households, followed by the IV model of commercial 
fertilizer controlling for the endogeneity of acquiring subsidized fertilizer, using fixed effects.  
All of these findings present insight into the interaction between the government and private input markets.   It should be noted that our initial estimation included dummy variables for the 
year in the sample.  Unfortunately, these variables were highly correlated with other variables in 
the model so to avoid multicollinearity, we excluded them from the final estimation. 
  Table 1 presents the distribution of the variables used in the analysis.  The fertilizer use 
variables for commercial and subsidized fertilizer show that the majority of farmers in the survey 
did not use fertilizer with the median value being zero kg per household for both variables.  The 
majority of farmers in the survey were small farmers with the median farm having less than one 
hectare.   One of the instrumental variables years household head lived in village had a wide 
ranging distribution from 4 years at 10% of the distribution to more than 62 years at 90% of the 
distribution.  The other IV, the binary MP variable, indicates that only 20% of the respondents 
had a member of parliament living in their community.   
Table 2 displays the percentage of respondents in the different years of the survey who 
used commercial and subsidized fertilizer.  The results indicate that a significantly higher 
number of respondents used commercial fertilizer in 2002/03 and 2003/04 compared to 2006/07 
after the government scaled up the subsidy program.  Not surprisingly a higher percentage of 
farmers used subsidized fertilizer in 2006/07 than they did in earlier years before the large scale 
subsidy began.  These results provide some initial indication of the negative relationship between 
subsidized fertilizer acquisition and commercial fertilizer purchases.  
Figures 1 and 2 provide further evidence about the negative correlation between 
subsidized and commercial fertilizer.  These figures are the empirical results of equation (2) in 
the conceptual framework.  This bivariate analysis shows the change in quantity of commercial 
fertilizer purchased given a change in subsidized fertilizer. The negative coefficients (-0.49) 
between 2002/03 & 20006/07 and (-0.62) between 2003/04 & 2006/07 indicate that a one kg increase in subsidized fertilizer acquired leads to a 0.49 and 0.62 kg decrease in commercial 
fertilizer purchases respectively.  This simple bivariate analysis does not control for other factors 
that may affect commercial fertilizer purchases over time, but it does provide further evidence 
that government fertilizer distribution channels crowd out private sector sales.   
Table 3 displays the results of the fixed effects estimator on the factors influencing 
commercial fertilizer purchases.  It is important to note that these results do not control for the 
potential endogeneity of subsidized fertilizer acquisition.  These findings indicate that subsidized 
fertilizer acquisition has a significant negative impact on commercial fertilizer purchases.  The 
coefficient on subsidized use is small (-.06), indicating that every kg of subsidized fertilizer 
displaces 0.06 kg of commercial fertilizer.  Household assets and landholdings have a significant 
positive impact of commercial fertilizer purchases.   This indicates that wealthier farmers are 
more likely to purchase fertilizer through commercial channels, as we would expect.  Price of 
NPK fertilizer has a significant negative effect on commercial purchases, meaning the higher the 
price of fertilizer, the less likely farmers are to purchase it.  The price of maize has a significant 
positive effect on commercial fertilizer purchases.  This indicates that farmers will invest in 
fertilizer if they believe the returns from growing will be worth the cost of the input.  
Table 4 displays the results of the fixed effects estimator on factors that determine how 
much subsidized fertilizer farmers receive.   The variable for land holdings is marginally 
significant with a positive coefficient and the asset value variable is almost significant with a 
positive coefficient.  This indicates hat wealthier farmers with more land may be able to obtain 
the subsidized fertilizer intended for farmers with more limited resources.  Local maize price is 
also significant with a positive coefficient as is the number of female adults over 65 in the 
household. The two instrumental variables that will be used in the second stage of the regression, 
years lived in the village, and if a member of parliament resides in the village are both highly 
significant and positively impact the amount of subsidized fertilizer acquired in Table 4.  These 
findings indicate that social capital matters in terms of who receives subsidized fertilizer.  For 
example, people with longer tenure in the village are better connected and more likely to be 
influential in the community and therefore be able to obtain subsidizes more easily that less well 
connected people.  The significance of the parliament member variable indicates that subsidies 
are political in nature and politicians seem to be rewarding their own constituents with fertilizer 
subsidies.   The significance of these two variables on amount subsidized fertilizer received 
raises questions as to the effectiveness of the program at targeting the people who truly need the 
fertilizer rather than those who are well connected.  
As mentioned earlier, years lived in village and if a member of parliament lives in the 
village make excellent instrumental variables because they significantly impact subsidized 
fertilizer acquisition but to not directly impact farmers’ decisions to purchase commercial 
fertilizer.  Table 5 presents the results from the IV fixed effects estimator on factors influencing 
how much commercial fertilizer farmers purchase, while controlling for the endogenous factors 
that affect subsidized fertilizer acquisition.  The results indicate that in the fixed effects IV 
estimation, subsidized fertilizer has significant negative impact on commercial fertilizer 
purchases.  The coefficient on subsidized fertilizer purchases is (-0.61), ten times larger than the 
coefficient on subsidized fertilizer in Table 3 when subsidized fertilizer use is treated as 
exogenous.  These results provide evidence that after controlling for the endogeneity of 
subsidized fertilizer with the instrumental variables, subsidized fertilizer seriously displaces 
commercial sales.  According to these results, every kg of subsidized fertilizer a farmer receives causes him or her to reduce commercial purchases by 0.61 kg.  Asset value and land holdings are 
also significant with positive coefficients, indicating that large farmers with more assets buy 
greater quantities of commercial fertilizer.  In addition, maize price has a positive and significant 
impact on commercial fertilizer use.  The price of fertilizer in the IV regression is not significant.  
 
Conclusions 
In many developing countries, farmer input demand is affected by the interplay of public 
and commercial input distribution systems.  There are concerns that the demand for commercial 
inputs may be displaced by the operation of government programs.  This paper develops a 
modeling framework to empirically estimate the degree of displacement of farmers’ purchase of 
fertilizer, taking explicit account of dual input marketing channels.  Second, the paper identifies 
the factors influencing the probability of households acquiring fertilizer from alternate 
distribution channels as well as the amount acquired from each channel.  In so doing, we 
estimate the degree of displacement of private fertilizer sales due to government subsidized 
fertilizer programs.  Third, we identify the potential to increase fertilizer use through public 
policy tools.   
Our main findings are as follows: First, when subsidized fertilizer purchases are treated 
as exogenous as in Table 3, then acquiring subsidized fertilizer is found to have a significant 
negative impact on commercial fertilizer, but the coefficient (-0.06) is very small.  This may 
cause some policy makers to believe that implementing a fertilizer subsidy program will have 
minimal negative impact on commercial sales.  However, when considering the likely 
endogeneity of subsidized fertilizer acquisition, the displacement effect is ten times larger with a 
coefficient of (-0.61).  Controlling for endogeneity will generally produce more accurate model estimates, and hence the analysis would indicate, therefore, that the government subsidy program 
in Malawi has had a major negative impact on demand for fertilizer through commercial 
channels.  This finding means that government must pay close attention to potential 
displacement.  Furthermore, government programs should be designed to target households 
without effective demand in order to ensure that fertilizer subsidy programs maximize their 
impact on total fertilizer use and hence contribute to their cost-effectiveness.    
The results also indicate that wealthy farmers are more likely to purchases commercial 
fertilizer, as expected.  Acquisition of subsidized government fertilizer is also correlated with 
household wealth, years that the household head lived in the village, and whether a Member of 
Parliament resided in the community.  The statistical significance of these variables in the 
government fertilizer acquisition model reflect the importance of social capital between the 
household and village authorities determining who the allocation of subsidized fertilizer as well 
as the importance of political representation in subsidy allocation.  In our model in Table 3 
which treats subsidized fertilizer as exogenous, we found the price of fertilizer is significantly 
correlated with commercial purchases, having a price elasticity of demand of -0.73.  However 
using the model in Table 5, which treats subsidized fertilizer as exogenous, we find that price of 
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South-Western Book Co. Table 1:  Distribution of the Variables 
 
Value at the different percentiles of 
the Distribution 
variable description  10 25 50 75 90  mean 
Age of 
household 
head  Age  of  household  head  in  years  26 32 43 59 72 46
Asset value 
2006/07 Value of all durable assets in 1,000 
Malawian  Kwacha  0.4  1.4  5.24 12.38 36.82 24.15
Children under 
12 yrs old  
Number of children under the age of 12 
living in the household  0 1 2 3 4 1.91
Commercial 
fertilizer 
Quantity of fertilizer purchased through 
commercial channels (in kg)  0  0  0  20  100 42.23
Female adults 
under  
Number of females under the age of 65 
living  in  the  household  1 1 1 2 3 1.46
Female headed 
household  Binary (1 if household headed by female)  0  0  0  1  1 0.26
Females over 
65 yrs old  
Number of females over the age of 65 living 
in  the  household    0 0 0 0 1 0.13
Fertilizer price 
District level price of NPK fertilizer per kg 
in Malawian Kwacha, in 2006/07.  47.9  51.6  56.7  70  74 60.9
Land holdings  Number of hectares owned by the household  0.32  0.55  0.91  1.61  2.43 1.24
Maize price 
District level price of Local maize per kg in 
Malawian  Kwacha,  in  2006/07.  10 10.72 10.72 12.86  15 11.62
Male adults 
under 65 yrs 
old  
Number of males under the age of 65 living 
in  the  household  0 0 1 2 3 1.4
Males over 65 
yrs old 
Number of males over the age of 65 living in 
the  household  0 0 0 0 1 0.11
Mortality  
Binary (1 if household member died  in past 
three  years)  0 0 0 0 1 0.12
MP in 
Community 
Binary (1 if member of parliament lives in 
the community)  0 0 0 0 1 0.2
Rainfall  
Rainfall in cm by district between October 
and December (planting season)  148.8 208.9 276.3 358.9 405.5 282.47
Subsidized 
fertilizer 
Quantity of fertilizer acquired through 
government channels (in kg)  0  0  0  50  100 37.55
Years lived in 
Village 
Years household head has lived in the village 














Percentages of Respondents Who Used Subsidized and Commercial Fertilizer in Different 
















































 2002/03 2003/04 2006/07 
Percent of Respondents Using 
Commercial Fertilizer  42 35 16
Percent of Respondents Using  
Subsidized Fertilizer  24 35 56
Percent of Respondents Using Both 
Commercial and Subsidized 
Fertilizer 96 109 169
 
 
Sample Number  1186 1405 2591Table 3   
Factors Influencing Commercial Fertilizer Purchases (Without Controlling for 
Endogeneity of Subsidized Fertilizer) 
Fixed-effects (within) regression      Number of obs  =  5182 
Group variable (i): case             Number of groups  =  2591 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1209            Obs. per group: min  =  2 
       between = 0.1734                                    avg.  =  2 
          overall = 0.1525                                     max  =  2 
 
                                                       F(14,2577)  =  25.30 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1134                               Prob > F  =    0.0 
 
Variable              Commercial Fertilizer Purchases 
Subsidized fertilizer                                    -0.06*** 
 (0.00) 
Asset value  0.04** 
 (0.02) 
Land holdings  32.72*** 
 (0.00) 
Female headed household  -9.55 
 (0.54) 
Household head age  -0.90 
 (0.14) 
Males over 65 yrs old  -1.33 
 (0.94) 
Female over 65 yrs old  -0.25 
 (0.99) 
Male adult under 65 yrs. old  -4.92 
 (0.31) 
Female adult under 65 yrs. old  1.71 
 (0.71) 
Child under 12 yrs. old  5.18 
 (0.09)* 
Mortality   1.77 
 (0.83) 
Maize price  3.15** 
 (0.03) 







Note: Dependent variable is the amount of commercial fertilizer purchased (in kgs.); 
*, **, *** indicate coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; 
 p-values in parenthesis  
 Table 4  
           Factors Influencing Government Subsidized Fertilizer Acquisition 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression                              Number of obs.  =  5182 
Group variable (i): case                                         Number of groups  =  2591 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0521                                    Obs per group: min  =  2 
       between = 0.0052                                                             avg  =  2 
          overall = 0.0155                                                              max  =  2 
 
F(13,2578) =  10.90 
corr(u_i, Xb)      =            -0.2801                             Prob > F  =  0.0 
                
Variable                     Subsidized Fertilizer Acquired 
Asset value                                          0.04 
 (0.13) 
Land holdings  5.28* 
 (0.10) 
Female headed household  -9.15 
 (0.71) 
Household head age  0.46 
 (0.63) 
Male over 65 yrs. old  31.42 
 (0.26) 
Female over 65 yrs. old  0.71 
 (0.98) 
Male adult under 65 yrs old  6.35 
 (0.41) 
Femal adult under 65 yrs. old  11.90* 
 (0.10) 
Chlld under 12 yrs. old  2.00 
 (0.68) 
Mortality   24.26* 
 (0.07) 
Maize price  8.59*** 
 (0.00) 
MP lives in community  21.11* 
 (0.06) 





Note:  Dependent variable is the amount of subsidized fertilizer acquired (in kgs.); 
*, **, *** indicate coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; 
 p-values in parenthesis  
 
 
 Table 5   
Factors Influencing Commercial Fertilizer Purchases (Using IV to Control for Endogeneity 
of Subsidized Fertilizer Acquisition) 
Fixed-effects (within) IV regression                        Number of obs  =  5182 
Group variable: case                                 Number of groups  =  2591 
 
R-sq:  within     =        .                         Obs per group: min  =  2 
between           =      0.0344                                              avg  =  2 
overall              =      0.0362                                             max  =  2 
 
Wald chi2(14)  =  491.83 
    corr(u_i, Xb)  =    -0.3122                         Prob > chi2  =  0.0 
 
Variables Commercial  Fertilizer Purchases 
Subsidized fertilizer  -0.61*** 
 (0.00) 




Female headed household  -17.15 
 (0.41) 
House hold head age  -1.13 
 (0.16) 
Male over 65 yrs. old  13.11 
 (0.58) 
Female over 65 yrs. old  4.29 
 (0.83) 
Male adult under 65 yrs old  -2.26 
 (0.73) 
Femal adult under 65 yrs. old  6.93 
 (0.27) 
Chlld under 12 yrs. old  4.75 
 (0.23) 
Mortality   12.64 
 (0.28) 
Maize price  8.28*** 
 (0.00) 







Note:  Dependent variable is the amount of commercial fertilizer purchased (in kgs.); 
           Instrumental variables are (1) Yrs. lived in village, (2) If MP lives in village; 
*, **, *** indicate coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; 




Change in Fertilizer Acquisition Between 2002/2003 & 2006/2007 at HH Level 
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Change in Fertilizer Acquisition Between 2003/04 & 2006/07 at HH Level 
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Slope of Fitted Line = -0.62                                               Number of Obs. = 408
 
 
 
 
 